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Implications of Japan’s long-term climate mitigation target and the relevance 
of uncertain nuclear policy 
 
Abstract 
Achieving long-term climate mitigation goals in Japan faces several challenges, starting 
with the uncertain nuclear power policy after the 2011 earthquake, the uncertain 
availability and progress of energy technologies, as well as energy security concerns in 
light of a high dependency on fuel imports.  The combined weight of these challenges 
needs to be clarified in terms of the energy system and macroeconomic impacts.  We 
applied a general equilibrium energy economic model to assess these impacts on an 80% 
emission reduction target by 2050 considering several alternative scenarios for nuclear 
power deployment, technology availability, end use energy efficiency, and the price of 
fossil fuels.  We found that achieving the mitigation target was feasible for all scenarios, 
with considerable reductions in total energy consumption (39-50%), higher shares of low-
carbon sources (43-72% compared to 15%), and larger shares of electricity in the final 
energy supply (51-58% compared to 42%).  The economic impacts of limiting nuclear 
power by 2050 (3.5% GDP loss) were small compared to the lack of carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) (6.4% GDP loss).  Mitigation scenarios led to an improvement in energy 
security indicators (trade dependency and diversity of primary energy sources) even in the 
absence of nuclear power.  Moreover, preliminary analysis indicates that expanding the 
range of renewable energy resources can lower the macroeconomic impacts of the long 
term target considerably, and thus further in depth analysis is needed on this aspect.   
Key policy insights 
• For Japan, an emissions reduction target of 80% by 2050 is feasible without nuclear 
power or CCS. 
• The macroeconomic impact of such a 2050 target was largest without CCS, and 
smallest without nuclear power. 
• Energy security indicators improved in mitigation scenarios compared to the baseline. 
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Introduction 
 
Japan announced in its nationally determined contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement a 
target of 26% reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030 compared to 2013 
(Government of Japan, 2015).  The consistency of the NDC target with the global goal for 
keeping global temperature change well below 2 degrees Celsius within this century (known as 
the 2 degree target), will require further emission reductions in the long term.  The government 
made public a statement on efforts to achieve an 80% reduction in emissions by 2050 
(Government of Japan, 2013).  This goal derives from the common vision agreed upon by 
countries in the G8 (of which Japan is a member) for reducing GHG emissions by 2050, and it is 
regarded as being in line with the 2 degree target (Kawase and Matsuoka, 2013).  In 2014, GHG 
emissions in Japan reached 1.364 GtCO2eq, with CO2 from fossil fuels and industry being the 
largest source of emissions (90%) (Ministry of Environment of Japan, 2016).  The power sector 
alone was a major contributor to total emissions, which have experienced a steep increase in the 
last decade after nuclear power supply was substituted by fossil fuels (initially mainly natural gas 
and oil, and later coal), after the events triggered by the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, 
including the disaster at the Fukushima nuclear power plant.   
 
The particular socioeconomic situation of Japan poses several challenges for long-term climate 
mitigation in addition to the costs it entails.  On the one hand, the availability and affordability of 
key low-carbon energy technologies remain uncertain, in particular for nuclear power, carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) and renewables. The 2011 earthquake and tsunami resulted in the 
shutting down of almost all nuclear power plants in the country, and rigorous verification was 
carried out on the safety of these facilities.  Restarting the nuclear plants requires approval from 
local governments, and in some cases, district courts have challenged rulings that have favoured 
prefectural and national efforts to resume nuclear power generation (World Nuclear Association, 
2018).  Currently only five nuclear power plants in the country are operating (out of a total of 
nine units as of 2018) (METI/Agency for Natural Resources and Energy).  This situation led to 
the revision of the national energy plan, the GHG mitigation targets, and the role of nuclear 
power in achieving those targets (IEA, 2016).   
With respect to CCS, only two applications for power generation are ready at commercial scale 
in the world, and progress has been slower than expected (Global CCS Institute, 2017).  Thus, 
considerable cost reductions and policy support, such as carbon pricing or subsidies, will be 
required to realize the potential for sequestering a meaningful amount of CO2 emissions in the 
future (IEA, 2013; McCulloch, Keeling, Malischek, & Stanley, 2016).  For renewables, several 
barriers to penetration remain, such as: the technical and economic capability of the energy 
system to incorporate large amounts of variable electricity supply (as in the case of solar and 
wind power plants); the limited amount of renewable resource potential (as in the case of 
biomass); the cost of the technology; and the lengthy environmental approval process (as in the 
case of wind and geothermal power) (IEA, 2016).  While global renewable energy costs have 
decreased considerably in recent years, the costs in Japan remain higher compared to other 
countries, lowering expectations for cost reductions (IRENA, 2018).  In addition, there are 
institutional barriers to the penetration of renewables. These barriers are rooted in the vertically 
integrated structure of the power sector whereby it is controlled in each region by a single private 
utility.  However, recent regulations are promoting market liberalization, and will separate power 
transmission and distribution from supply and retail (IEA, 2016).   
 
On the other hand, there are significant uncertainties related to energy efficiency improvements 
and energy security concerns.  Energy intensity in Japan has consistently fallen due to the 
penetration of high efficiency technologies and devices into the industrial and residential sectors, 
but greater improvements may be cumbersome to realize (IEA, 2017a).  With respect to energy 
security, Japan is highly dependent on fossil fuel imports, and lacks significant deployment of 
domestic renewable energy resources or grid interconnections with neighbouring countries.  The 
share of energy supply from domestic sources (also referred to as energy self-sufficiency) was 
8.3% in 2016, dropping from 20% in 2010 to a low of 6.4% in 2014 (Agency for Natural 
Resources and Energy, 2017) mainly as a consequence of nuclear power stoppage after the 2011 
Fukushima disaster.  Japan has taken measures to alleviate energy security risks, for example by 
diversifying the portfolio of fuel imports with gas from other countries, and promoting domestic 
renewable energy through feed-in-tariff policies.   
 
There are several assessments of climate mitigation policies for Japan based on quantitative 
analysis of scenarios (Kuramochi, Asuka, Fekete, Tamura, & Höhne, 2016; Kuramochi, 
Wakiyama, & Kuriyama, 2017).  Some of these studies have focused on the near-term 
implications of nuclear power supply uncertainty, motivated by the Fukushima disaster (Esteban 
and Portugal-Pereira, 2014; Esteban et al., 2018; Homma and Akimoto, 2013; McLellan, Zhang, 
Utama, Farzaneh, & Ishihara, 2013; Portugal Pereira, Troncoso Parady, & Castro Dominguez, 
2014; Su, Zhou, Sun, & Nakagami, 2014; Takase and Suzuki, 2011).  Analysis of the 
implications of the NDC in mitigation scenarios is still emerging, and studies evaluating Japan’s 
NDC target in the context of long-term global mitigation targets are scarce (Akashi and 
Hanaoka, 2012; Masui, Oshiro, & Kainuma, 2015; Matsumoto and Shiraki, 2018; Oshiro, 
Kainuma, & Masui, 2016, 2017; Oshiro, Masui, & Kainuma, 2017; Sugiyama et al., 2019).  
Additionally, these studies lack any comprehensive insight into changes to the energy system or 
into the macroeconomic impacts of uncertain availability and performance of mitigation options 
in the power sector besides nuclear power, such as CCS and renewable energy technologies.  
Moreover, weighting the challenges to climate mitigation with respect to energy security in 2050 
scenarios is only considered by Oshiro, et al. (2016).   
 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the macroeconomic impacts of meeting the long-term 
climate mitigation goal of reducing emissions by 80% by 2050 in Japan, focusing on the 
relevance of nuclear policy relative to other uncertainties.  We demonstrate this with diagnostic 
scenarios assuming various uncertainties in technological availability, end use energy efficiency, 
and the price of fossil fuels.  In addition, the paper assesses the influence of climate policy on 
energy security, given the vulnerability of Japan's energy system to disruptions in fuel imports.  
For the analysis, a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is applied to assess Japan's 
NDC and its long-term target of 80% emission reduction by 2050.   
 
 
Methodology 
 
In this study we design scenarios considering mitigation targets with different assumptions for 
the availability of key technologies, and assess the impacts on Japan’s energy system and 
economy by means of a CGE model.  In addition, we consider other scenarios to examine 
specific uncertainties related to the energy demand and energy security dimensions.  The 
modelling approach and analysis covers only mitigation costs, and excludes any valuation of the 
costs of inaction in terms of climate change impacts.  
 
Model 
The Asia-Pacific Integrated Assessment Model CGE (AIM/CGE) model is applied for the case 
of Japan to assess a set of scenarios considering climate mitigation and technology constraints.  
The AIM/CGE is a computable general equilibrium model covering all economic activities and a 
full set of GHGs and air pollutants ((Fujimori et al., 2017; Fujimori, Masui, & Matsuoka, 2012).  
It is a dynamic recursive model which assumes investment decisions are based on the outcomes 
of the previous period and the prices of the current modelling period, without any foresight.  It 
includes 40 economic sectors and has a detailed description of the energy sector, the agricultural 
sector and land use activities on an annual basis.  The energy sector includes energy resources, 
conversion technologies, and end uses by final energy sources and services (trade of energy 
covers fossil fuels and bioenergy).  Features of energy resources and technologies (including 
CCS), such as efficiency and costs technologies, are based on IEA (International Energy Agency, 
2012) and relevant studies (Fujimori, et al., 2017; Hasegawa, Fujimori, Ito, Takahashi, & Masui, 
2017; Silva Herran, Dai, Fujimori, & Masui, 2016; World Energy Council, 2016).  The 
additional cost of integrating a variable supply from wind and solar power is included 
(daily/hourly supply/demand are not handled by the model) (H. Dai et al., 2017).  Mitigation 
policies are evaluated by means of a carbon price, which is levied on activities emitting GHGs.  
We run the AIM/CGE model in this study as a single national model (Chunark, 
Limmeechokchai, Fujimori, & Masui, 2017)). 
 
Scenarios  
An outline of the scenarios is presented in Table 1.  Scenarios included a Reference scenario 
(Reference) without mitigation policy, and a set of mitigation scenarios (NDC80) considering 
several uncertainties.  Mitigation scenarios assumed both the mid-term target represented by the 
NDC (25.4% emission reduction by 2030 compared to 2005 levels), and a long-term target (80% 
emission reduction by 2050 compared to 2005 levels).  GHG emissions (CO2, CH4, N2O, 
excluding fluorinated gases) throughout the timeframe of analysis are imposed exogenously 
(global warming potentials based on IPCC AR4 (IPCC, 2007) are assumed).  Accordingly, 
carbon prices are determined by the model to match the emissions constraint.    
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These mitigation scenarios were divided into two sub-sets.  The first set considers a case with 
availability of all technologies (Default_NDC80), and cases focusing on uncertainties in energy 
supply technologies, including nuclear power, CCS, and renewable energy.  The case restricting 
nuclear power (Nuc_L_NDC80) assumes a plant life of 40 years, and restarting of idle plants 
between 2020 and 2030 without new installations, resulting in phasing out by 2050.  The case 
restricting CCS (NoCCS_NDC80) assumes CCS is not available at all (in the Default scenario 
CCS is available from 2022).  For renewable energy technologies (RE_CostRed_L_NDC80) we 
assume a scenario with a slower rate of cost reductions (25% smaller compared to the 
Default_NDC80 scenario).   
 
The second set of mitigation scenarios are defined to analyze the implications on energy security 
against the macroeconomic impacts.  They focus on additional changes to nuclear power, and on 
aspects besides energy supply technologies, namely energy demand efficiency and energy 
security.  For nuclear power, we test the feasibility of Japan’s climate goals against extreme 
situations for nuclear power supply, by means of a high-level scenario assuming extension of 
plant life from 40 to 60 years, full restart of idle plants by 2020 and three new installations 
(Nuc_H_NDC80), and a scenario with complete phase-out from 2020 (Nuc_no_NDC80).  The 
high-level scenario is consistent with well-known scenarios (IEA, 2017b; The Institute of Energy 
Economics, 2017).  For energy demand efficiency and energy security, we include scenarios with 
low levels of end-use energy efficiency, in terms of the rate of autonomous energy efficiency 
improvement (AEEI_L_NDC80) and of prices of fossil fuel imports (PrFossil_L_NDC80).   
 
Default assumptions for nuclear power supply are consistent with the NDC (20-22% of total 
power supply by 2030), projecting a decrease to 0.32 EJ/yr (89 TWh/yr) in 2050.  This 
projection is equivalent to the average of nuclear power supply assuming high (Nuc_H) and low 
(Nuc_L) levels (see Table 2 for details on relevant assumptions, and Figure S-1 in the 
supplementary information for the trajectories of nuclear power supply).  The underlying 
socioeconomic assumptions (population, GDP, etc.) were based on the SSP2 scenario, from the 
Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) (O’Neill et al., 2014; Riahi et al., 2017), as they provide 
trajectories up to 2050 under a consistent framework (Government projections for GDP are only 
available up to 2030; the effect of population and GDP assumptions on key outcomes is provided 
in Table S-1 of the supplement).  This pathway, which corresponds to a storyline picturing 
intermediate assumptions within the framework of the SSPs, results in the population decreasing 
to 109 million, and GDP increasing to USD2005 6.2 trillion (for the non-mitigation cases) by 
2050.  Assumptions related to energy resources, technologies and other parameters are 
documented in previous analysis using the AIM/CGE model (Fujimori, et al., 2017; Fujimori, et 
al., 2012).   
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Energy security analysis  
Given the low self-reliance of Japan in terms of energy supply, we evaluate the scenarios in the 
study with respect to energy security.  We evaluate two indicators: trade dependency as the share 
of imported fossil fuels in energy supply (nuclear fuel is regarded a domestic resource following 
IEA’s definition (Jewell, 2011)), and the Shannon-Wiener index for energy diversity (Grubb, 
Butler, & Twomey, 2006; Jewell, Cherp, & Riahi, 2014; Kruyt, van Vuuren, de Vries, & 
Groenenberg, 2009).  The former quantifies the vulnerability of energy supply to disruptions in 
trade of fuels, which are external to the national energy system.  The latter quantifies the 
versatility of the energy system to balance changes in supply with increased variety of energy 
sources, and captures to some extent external and domestic disruptions to energy supply.  It has 
to be noted that we are not aiming for a comprehensive evaluation of energy security, given that 
it has several interpretations and contexts, and, thus, multiple indicators to quantify it.  The 
indicators evaluated have been selected because they are commonly used in mitigation scenario 
assessments; they can be estimated with the outcomes from the CGE model applied in the study, 
and they highlight representative aspects within the energy security dimension.   
 
 
Results 
 
Features of the Reference scenario.   
 
In the Reference scenario, CO2 emissions in Japan reached 1,458 Mt CO2 in 2050, equivalent to 
a 7% increase compared to 2005.  Energy supply, presented in Figure 1, showed a steady 
increase in total primary energy supply (TPES) reaching 21 EJ in 2050, an 8.6% increase 
compared to 2005.  Fossil fuels covered most of the supply (85%), with oil taking the main share 
(36% of TPES).  The mix of electricity supply by technologies, presented in Figure 1-b), 
remained dominated by fossil fuels, with increased amounts of renewables.  The diminishing role 
of nuclear power assumed in the Reference scenario led to a share of 5% of power supply in 
2050.  Final energy supply, presented in Figure 1-c), was dominated by liquids (mainly transport 
fuels) and electricity with similar shares, accounting for 46% and 42% of the total in 2050, 
respectively.   
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 Features of the Mitigation scenarios   
 
Outcomes in the first group of Mitigation scenarios, presented in Figure 2, showed a decrease in 
energy consumption, higher shares of electricity in final energy supply, and the enhanced role of 
natural gas and renewables in the energy mix (see also Figure S-2 and Figure S-3 in the 
supplement).  Compared to the Reference scenario, in the Default_NDC80 scenario, TPES and 
final energy consumption in 2050 decreased by 36% and 39%, respectively.  The share of fossil 
fuels fell considerably, but still covered more than half of the energy supply.  Most of the 
renewable energy supply corresponded to biomass (13% of TPES), followed by solar and wind.  
In contrast, the electricity supply was dominated by renewables and fossil fuels with CCS, which 
in 2050 represented 48% and 31% of the total, respectively.  As presented in Figure 3 (see also 
Figure S-2 in the supplement), a large reduction in emissions was enabled also by a larger share 
of electricity in the final energy supply (around 58% in 2050), which improved the energy 
conversion efficiency and carbon intensity (by replacing coal and oil with natural gas), and the 
penetration of carbon neutral technologies (such as PV and wind).  Phasing out nuclear power in 
2050 (Nuc_L_NDC80 scenario) promoted a slight reduction in total energy supply compared to 
the Default_NDC80 scenario.  Changes in renewable technology costs (RE_CostRed_L_NDC80 
scenario) slightly affected total energy supply, with no significant changes in the energy mix.  In 
the NoCCS_NDC80 scenario, energy supply decreased considerably (71% compared to the 
Default_NDC80 scenario) and biomass without CCS replaced biomass with CCS.   
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CCS had an important role in complementing the decarbonization of energy supply in the long 
term, along with renewables.  Interestingly, the absence of CCS (NoCCS_NDC80 scenario) did 
not result in greater use of renewable resources (besides a slight increase in biomass).  Such 
inelastic behaviour of renewable supply in 2050 was also observed in other scenarios.  We can 
identify three factors explaining this outcome.  First was the relatively small resource potential of 
solar and wind assumed in the model (1.0EJ/yr and 0.5EJ/yr for solar PV and onshore wind, 
respectively (see Hancheng Dai, Silva Herran, Fujimori, & Masui, 2016; Fujimori, et al., 2017; 
Fujimori, et al., 2012; Silva, 2012; Silva Herran, et al., 2016) for relevant assumptions), which 
resulted in the system making full use of this potential to meet the mitigation target.  In fact, even 
the resource potential with the highest unit supply costs (i.e., lowest quality) assumed in the 
model was deployed by 2050.  We elaborate further on the role of energy potential assumptions 
below.  The second factor was the maximum penetration rate of low-carbon technologies, which 
prevented faster penetration of renewables with available resource potential (such as biomass).  
Thirdly there was an increase in average electricity prices driven by the carbon price, which 
favoured energy demand reductions instead of larger penetration of renewables.   
 
Table 3 shows the average electricity prices, the carbon prices, and the macroeconomic impact 
expressed as percentage GDP losses.  All mitigation scenarios led to a considerable increase in 
electricity prices along with carbon prices, which reached similar values by 2050, except for the 
NoCCS_NDC80 scenario.  Therefore, the absence of CCS is a key factor in shaping the 
macroeconomic impact of achieving mitigation targets in Japan.  GDP losses were between 3.4 
and 6.4% in 2050.  The largest impact was observed for the NoCCS_NDC80 scenario (6.4%), 
followed by the scenario assuming changes in the rate of cost reduction of renewable energy 
(RE_CostRed_L_NDC80).   
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Mapping mitigation scenarios in the energy security dimension   
 
To get deeper insights into the robustness of the long-term mitigation target, we analyzed the 
implications on energy security against the macroeconomic impacts.  We assessed an extended 
set of scenarios to elicit a response to uncertainties related to nuclear power availability and 
aspects beyond energy technology availability, namely energy demand and energy security (i.e. 
stability of energy supply).  The outcomes of these scenarios were compared to the mitigation 
scenario assuming default conditions (Default_NDC80).   
 
The largest macroeconomic impact of mitigation in terms of GDP losses was still for the 
NoCCS_NDC80 scenario (6.4%), followed by the scenarios assuming low levels of renewable 
energy cost reduction RE_CostRed_L_NDC80 (4.2%).   GDP losses larger than that of the 
Default_NDC80 scenario were within a close range of values (3.5 – 3.8%), and corresponded to 
those assuming challenging conditions for climate mitigation (e.g. Nuc_L_NDC80).  It is worth 
noting that in the scenario assuming early phase-out of nuclear power (Nuc_no_NDC80), GDP 
losses were the same as for the default case.  For this scenario, GDP losses were higher than the 
default scenario until around 2035 (see Figure S-4 in the supplementary information), 
demonstrating that the importance of macroeconomic impacts of early nuclear phase-out depends 
on the timeframe of analysis.  In the absence of nuclear power, the penetration of other low-
carbon technologies (which otherwise could not rapidly enter the market due to the long life of 
nuclear power installations), and the reduction in energy consumption (which scales down new 
investments), can lessen mitigation costs in the long term.  This contrasting pattern between near 
and long-term impacts is also reflected in the energy system.  While this issue is relevant for the 
assessment of Japan’s climate mitigation policies, only a brief discussion is provided in the next 
section as it is out of the scope of this study.   
 
 
The scenarios were mapped against the outcomes for the energy security indicators and the 
macroeconomic impacts (measured as GDP losses).  The maps, presented in Figure 4, showed 
that energy security indicators improve considerably in mitigation scenarios.  Among the 
scenarios, only the absence of CCS (NoCCS_NDC80) produced a clear difference in terms of 
fuel import dependency, while a marked distribution was observed for energy diversity.  The 
NoCCS_NDC80 scenario had the largest mitigation costs, but at the same time, showed the 
largest improvements in dependency in fuel imports.  This outcome highlights the double role of 
CCS as a cost-effective option to achieve large emissions reductions in the long term, and as a 
barrier to shifting away from fossil fuels, which for a country like Japan translates into fewer 
opportunities for improving self-sufficiency.  In terms of diversity of energy supply sources, lack 
of CCS resulted in the lowest improvement among mitigation scenarios.  This was a result of an 
energy mix with more disparity in the shares of energy sources, driven by the larger importance 
of renewables and the very minor contribution of coal and oil compared to other scenarios.  
Availability of nuclear power had a small role in improving energy dependency, compared to 
improvements in energy demand efficiency and changes in fossil fuel prices.  While the absence 
of nuclear power had an evident effect on the energy diversity indicator compared to other 
uncertainties, this effect was small compared to the effect of whether or not climate mitigation 
targets were implemented.  Differences in the impacts of mitigation in terms of macroeconomic 
costs and energy security across scenarios became evident only in the long term (2050), while 
nuclear power availability and fossil fuel prices produced already marked differences in energy 
security in the near term (2030).    
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Preliminary analysis on the renewable energy resource assumptions  
 
As mentioned above, the contribution of renewable energy in 2050 was almost uniform across all 
scenarios, in spite of the wide range of carbon prices indicated by the model.  However, it is 
likely that high carbon prices allow for additional amounts of renewable energy from “low 
quality” resources (i.e., low capacity factors, high energy supply costs, low technical feasibility, 
etc.).  To further explore the role of renewables we conducted a preliminary analysis by 
incorporating in the model the resource potentials of solar PV installed in vertical surfaces (e.g., 
building facades), and of offshore wind power.  These renewable resources, currently not 
included in the model, were added to the energy potential with the highest unit supply costs (i.e., 
lowest capacity factors).   
 
The outcomes for selected scenarios, presented in Table 4, showed that these two resources can 
add 5 EJ/yr to the energy supply, and could increase the share of renewables in the power mix up 
to 76% (compared to 22-67% in the scenarios in this study).  In addition, the inclusion of these 
resources resulted in considerably lower carbon prices (29-57% lower than the original results) 
in 2050, as well as GDP losses (10-43% lower). It is worth noting that the revised assumptions 
on solar and wind power energy potentials, did not alter the findings of this research (i.e., lack of 
CCS has the largest macroeconomic impact, and nuclear phase out leads to a relatively small 
difference with the default scenario with all mitigation options).  However, we acknowledge that 
this analysis shows only an approximated picture of the issue, therefore, further research on the 
role of scaling up renewable energy deployment is needed.   
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Discussion 
 
Some aspects relevant to this study remain unclear due to limitations of the model to deal with 
certain issues.  Here we reflect further on the feasibility of mitigation targets under the 
uncertainties assessed (nuclear power policy, CCS availability, renewable energy, and end use 
energy efficiency) and the implications for energy security.   
 
The role of nuclear power in Japan has been at the centre of discussions after the events 
following the earthquake and tsunami in March 2011.  Currently, nuclear power deployment is 
still being considered as an energy source for the coming decades, and as an option for long-term 
climate mitigation, as presented in the latest national energy plan by the government 
(Government of Japan, 2018).  According to our analysis, from a long-term perspective, phasing-
out nuclear power is not a critical limitation to mitigation, but the short-term impacts of nuclear 
power deployment are complex.  On the one hand, early phase-out will bring direct negative 
economic implications on the companies operating nuclear power plants. There are also rising 
concerns over stranded assets in nuclear power plants with several decades of potential 
operation, and over the labour market and supply chain associated with the maintenance and 
operation of facilities.  Moreover, lack of nuclear power may increase dependence on fossil fuels 
imports, exacerbating the vulnerability of fuel supply in the country.  On the other hand, shifting 
away from nuclear power may respond to concerns over the safety of facilities, the postponed 
issue of proper disposal of nuclear waste, and decreasing social acceptability. Such a shift would 
also make room for alternative local energy supply sources and efficiency measures, contributing 
to diversification of the energy portfolio and improvement of the country’s resilience to energy 
supply shocks.   
 
Reconciling the trade-offs between short and long-term perspectives for nuclear energy and 
climate policies requires leveraging different risks.  Climate mitigation policies are motivated by 
a long-term perspective addressing the risks posed by climate change for present and future 
generations.  The size and distribution of such risks are highly uncertain, but they are likely to 
have impacts that may be irreversible across several regions and sectors in multiple ways.  Our 
analysis indicated that nuclear policy would have a small impact on the balance between the 
benefit and cost of climate mitigation by 2050.  In contrast, nuclear energy policies are 
formulated to respond to energy demands for current generations.  Thus, phasing out nuclear 
power brings impacts evident in the near term, and will require immediate measures for the 
affected stakeholders to adapt to the new situation.  In fact, our analysis showed that an early 
phase-out scenario resulted in larger GDP losses by 2030.  Given that this study focused on the 
long term (i.e., 2050) implications of climate policies, further analysis is recommended to better 
understand the trade-offs against short-term policy perspectives.   
 
With respect to renewable energy, major challenges are adapting existing infrastructure to 
accommodate larger amounts of variable energy supply from solar and wind power, securing a 
stable supply of biomass resources for bioenergy supply, and realising the potential for 
renewable resources that are currently unaffordable. Policies favouring renewable energy in 
Japan, such as the feed-in-tariff system implemented since 2012, have increased the installed 
capacity of solar PV, wind power and biomass power.  However, potential supply from new solar 
and wind installations has been constrained by the limits imposed by the electricity grid 
operators on the amount of variable power supply (Kimura, 2017).  To overcome this issue, the 
power system will need to become more flexible by means of batteries, gas power and enhanced 
exchanges of electricity among regions in the national grid (Wakiyama and Kuriyama, 2018).  
Also, the sustainability of power supply from renewables without the support of feed-in-tariffs 
may be affected, in particular for biomass power plants, as they incur large fuel costs.  Another 
concern is the effect of technology imports driven by renewable energy development on the 
domestic market (trade of energy technologies is not considered in this study).  In spite of the 
above challenges, larger shares of renewable energy may be possible with untapped resource 
potentials through new technologies, such as solar panels on building facades and use of offshore 
wind, which are not handled by the model in this study (a preliminary analysis is included in the 
results section and Table 4).   
 
As for CCS, investment, technical and safety barriers will need to be overcome in 
order to realize the level of penetration needed for long-term climate mitigation.  
Currently, in Japan there is one large-scale CCS project operating since 2016 and 
several other pilot scale projects (Global CCS Institute, 2017).  Another issue is the 
CO2 storage potential.  According to some sources the potential in Japan may be as 
low as 5 GtCO2 (Ricci and Selosse, 2013), or as high as 140 GtCO2 (Consoli and 
Wildgust).  Although cumulative CO2 sequestration constraints were not 
considered in this study, scenario outcomes (less than 3 GtCO2 by 2050) were 
below the low range of sequestration potentials in the literature.  Other barriers to 
CCS penetration include risk perceptions by investors and the public.  Investors 
have concerns that focus on the large scale of investments needed compared with 
uncertain prospects for profitable operation, along with the lack of robust 
economic incentives.  The general public focuses on safety concerns, and regards it 
as more acceptable to redirect investments to less uncertain mitigation options such 
as renewables (Johnsson, Reiner, Itaoka, & Herzog, 2010; Leung, Caramanna, & 
Maroto-Valer, 2014).   
 
The effect of improved energy efficiency has been recognized by industries and this has led to 
the diffusion of highly efficient appliances and practices in the residential and commercial 
sectors.  Boosting rates of improvement may be challenging for many technologies and practices 
that are already highly energy-efficient, and where further improvements can be difficult or 
expensive.  However, some industries in Japan with lower energy efficiency compared to other 
developed nations have the potential to improve their performance (Honma and Hu, 2014).  
Additionally, other measures can complement emissions reductions from the demand side, such 
as lifestyle changes, disruptive innovations (such as new technologies and practices creating or 
withdrawing the need for an energy service), or strong policies promoting energy saving.   
 
With respect to the economic impacts, how well each outcome for these scenarios will be 
accepted differs among national stakeholders, given that these impacts will be distributed 
unevenly across sectors and points in time.  Fossil fuel industries and carbon intensive activities 
bear the largest burden from climate policies introducing carbon prices.  In addition, as 
highlighted by the analysis, electricity prices are likely to increase considerably in the long term, 
affecting energy expenditures in both households and businesses.  In order to accommodate these 
transformations and lessen the negative impacts, considerable changes will be necessary.  The 
structure of the economy will need a larger share of industries with low energy and carbon 
intensities, and more service-oriented activities.  Consumption behaviour of end users will have 
to shift to low-carbon energy sources, adopt less energy-intensive (i.e., more efficient) 
technologies, and have lower total energy consumption.  At the same time, the revenues from 
carbon markets will have to be efficiently allocated to facilitate a smooth transition across 
sectors.   
 
Valuation and interpretation of the economic impact depends on the indicator and perspective 
considered.  In this study, impacts in terms of the GDP loss (3.3%-6.3%) were close to the range 
indicated by IPCC global assessments for stringent scenarios (2%-4%) consistent with the 2 
degree target (RCP2.6) (Clarke et al., 2014).  The carbon price is another indicator commonly 
used in quantitative assessments of climate policies on national and global scales.  Carbon prices 
by 2050 in the scenarios were considerably higher than in other studies.  For example, Oshiro et 
al. (2017) reported values for 2050 below USD2005 800/tCO2.  However, it has to be noted that 
the carbon price as an indicator has several limitations compared to GDP loss.  The carbon price 
is sensitive to many assumptions, and it only captures part of the economic effect of climate 
mitigation, since other policies and measures can also affect total economic output. It can also 
take on much higher values when assuming stringent targets, as the marginal abatement curve 
becomes very steep for large values of emission reductions.  A better indication of the equivalent 
value of future carbon prices in the present is provided by the discounted average value for the 
whole timeframe of analysis.  Assuming a discount rate of 5%, average discounted carbon prices 
in this study were USD2005 49-84/tCO2, which are considerably higher than the carbon prices for 
meeting the 2030 target (USD2005 20-29/tCO2 discounted at 5%), and this illustrates the 
misalignment of the NDC target with the 2050 goal.  Although these outcomes outweigh the 
carbon tax currently in place in Japan (USD 3/tCO2), they are within the upper range of values 
reported by the IPCC assessments, and are similar to carbon prices implemented in some 
countries (e.g., USD 55/tCO2 in France (World Bank and Ecofys, 2018)).   Carbon prices and 
economic impacts may be lowered if a more ambitious mitigation target for 2030 (i.e., the NDC) 
is put in place, which will prevent locking in carbon intensive infrastructure and will realize 
existing mitigation potentials.  Although it is not quantified in this study, we can anticipate lower 
economic impacts if mitigation capacity is boosted via faster improvements in energy efficiency 
on the supply and demand sides, and faster penetration and cost reductions of low-carbon energy 
technologies including CCS (see Table 4 in the results section for a description of a preliminary 
analysis including solar PV panels from vertical surfaces and offshore wind power resources).   
 
Realizing climate mitigation targets for Japan is aligned with improved energy security goals.  
This finding is also confirmed by Oshiro et al. (2016), who reported values of trade dependency 
similar to this study using a bottom-up technology selection model, but without any indication of 
the macroeconomic impacts.  Mitigation means shifting to a low-carbon and less intensive 
energy system, with more diversity of energy sources and less dependence on imported fuels.  
Therefore, mitigation costs can be seen as an investment to avoid not only the risks of climate 
change, but also those arising from sudden disruptions in fuel imports, or from impaired 
availability of certain technologies (e.g., nuclear power).  It is worth noting that the energy 
security dimension is broad, and that this study only focuses on two indicators.  Disruptions in 
the energy supply are manifold in nature, and as such they influence the role of each energy 
technology in different ways.  With respect to nuclear energy, the energy security dimension also 
relates to the risks posed by radioactive waste, by the release of radioactive materials due to 
aging facilities, by human error in plant operation, and by attacks and natural disasters (such as 
earthquakes), among others.   
 
 Conclusion  
 
This study showed that mitigation targets for the mid (NDC) and long term (80% emission 
reduction by 2050 compared to 2005 levels) for Japan are feasible under several scenarios from a 
macroeconomic modelling perspective, including early phase-out of nuclear power.  We showed 
quantitatively that the lack of CCS has considerably larger impacts on the energy system and the 
macroeconomy, and that uncertain nuclear power policy had a secondary role, given that it can 
be substituted with other sources (mainly natural gas) and measures (reduction of energy 
consumption) to achieve long-term mitigation targets with lower GDP losses.  In addition to 
scaling up low-carbon energy technologies, it could be seen that energy consumption reductions 
and higher electricity shares in the final energy supply had important roles in mitigation.  
Evaluation of technological uncertainties against changes in end use demand and energy security 
aspects revealed that lack of CCS and lower cost reductions for renewables produced the largest 
macroeconomic impacts, in comparison to pessimistic scenarios for energy efficiency 
improvements and fossil fuel prices.    
 
Achieving climate targets improved energy security indicators.  This was confirmed across all 
scenarios and multiple energy security indicators.  CCS contributed to the largest improvements 
in energy dependency, but to the lowest benefits in diversifying energy supply.  Also, the balance 
between mitigation costs and dependency in fuel imports was similar for other scenarios. In 
terms of energy diversity, even when this indicator was more affected by nuclear power 
availability than by other uncertainties, this indicator improved in all mitigation scenarios.  As a 
whole, the analysis showed that the effect of technology and other uncertainties on energy 
security indicators is slightly different, but relatively small compared to the improvement 
induced by achieving mitigation targets (compared to a business as usual scenario).   
 
In addition, preliminary analysis on the renewable energy resource potential showed that these 
assumptions have an important effect on the macroeconomic impact of mitigation goals, and 
therefore warrant further in depth research.  Further analysis is also needed to clarify the 
differences in near-term (by 2030) and long-term (by 2050) perspectives for climate mitigation 
in Japan. There also needs to be careful consideration of alternative pathways that increase the 
ambition in mitigation policies for the country, given the growing significance of the gap 
between current commitments and the 2 and 1.5 degree targets.  Moreover, conservative 
assumptions on the CGE model, such as having the same labour force supply across scenarios, 
need reconsideration to reflect possible changes stemming from stimulation of green industry, 
and the corresponding benefits to the macroeconomy.  Analysis is also needed to weigh climate 
mitigation costs against climate change impacts.  These issues are the challenges facing future 
studies in this area.   
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Tables 
 
Table 1  Features of the scenarios considered.   
Scenario name Description Assumptions 
Reference Without mitigation policies. Default values, levels of nuclear 
power supply are “Default” 
shown in Table 2 (includes 2030 
level as in NDC). 
Default _NDC80 Same as Reference but with 
mitigation targets. 
NDC by 2030 and 80% 
reduction by 2050.  
Nuc_L_NDC80 Same as Default_NDC80, but with 
low level of nuclear power supply. 
Low level of nuclear power 
supply towards phase out in 
2050 (see Table 2).  
NoCCS_NDC80 Same as Default_NDC80, but with 
no CCS.  
CCS unavailable. 
RE_CostRed_L_NDC
80 
Same as Default_NDC80, but with 
low level of renewable energy cost 
reduction. 
25% slower than in default 
scenario. 
Nuc_H_NDC80 Same as Default_NDC80 but with 
high level of nuclear power 
supply. 
High level of nuclear power 
supply (see Table 2). 
Nuc_no_NDC80 Same as Default_NDC80, but with 
no nuclear power supply. 
Nuclear power supply phase out 
since 2011. 
AEEI_L_NDC80 Same as Default_NDC80, but with 
low level of autonomous energy 
efficiency improvement. 
1.0% less annual improvement 
than in the default scenario.   
PrFossil_L_NDC80 
 
Same as Default_NDC80, but with 
low prices of fossil primary energy 
sources (coal, oil, gas). 
Change linearly reaching 50% 
of the price of the default 
scenario in 2050 
   
  
Table 2  Assumptions of nuclear power generation considered in the scenarios (the 
corresponding trajectories are plotted in Figure S-1 in the supplement).   
 Capacity a [GW] Generation b [TWh/yr] 
 2020 2030 2050 2020 2030  2050 
Default c 25.4 31.5 12.8 178 221 d 89 
High e 41.7 41.7 25.5 292 292 179 
Low f 9.1 21.4 0 64 150 0 
a Considers the age and operation status of existing plants and those under construction in 
Japan.  The status considers whether plants have legally applied for restart of operation 
(Genanshin).  
b Assuming capacity factor of 80% (utilization rates between 1990-2010 were 59%-84%) 
(Ministry of Environment of Japan, 2016).  
c Default values calculated as average of high and low levels. 
d Value for 2030 is in the range stipulated in the Japanese NDC (20-22% of total power 
supply). 
e Assumes extension of plant life from 40 to 60 years, full restart of idle plants by 2020 and 
three new installations. 
f Assumes plant life of 40 years and restart of idle plants between 2020 and 2030 without 
new installations. 
 
  
Table 3 Macroeconomic impacts in 2030 and 2050 across scenarios.  GDP loss only account for 
mitigation costs and exclude damages due to the impacts of climate change.  
 Electricity price 
[USD2005/GJ] 
Carbon price 
[USD2005/tCO2] 
GDP loss 
[%] 
 2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050 
Reference 45 42 0 0 0 0 
Default _NDC80 50 123 56 1,279 0.43 3.4 
Nuc_L_NDC80 51 134 52 1,298 0.40 3.5 
NoCCS_NDC80 50 265 56 2,854 0.43 6.4 
RE_CostRed_L_NDC80 50 126 55 1,300 0.57 4.2 
Nuc_H_NDC80 49 115 61 1,279 0.45 3.3 
Nuc_no_NDC80 56 129 62 1,269 0.49 3.4 
AEEI_L_NDC80 54 130 76 1,388 0.55 3.8 
PrFossil_L_NDC80 49 123 67 1,437 0.62 3.8 
       
 
  
Table 4 Outcomes in key indicators in 2030 and 2050 for selected scenarios with different 
assumptions for solar PV and wind energy resources.   
 Share renewable energy 
in electricity supply [%] 
Carbon price 
[USD2005/tCO2] 
GDP loss 
[%] 
 2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050 
Reference 15 22 0 0 0 0 
Default _NDC80 28 48 56 1,280 0.43 3.4 
Nuc_L_NDC80 28 52 52 1,298 0.40 3.5 
NoCCS_NDC80 28 67 56 2,854 0.43 6.4 
vreH_Reference 15 22 0 0 0 0 
vreH_Default_NDC80 28 66 55 911 0.43 3.0 
vreH_Nuc_L_NDC80 29 69 51 907 0.40 3.1 
vreH_NoCCS_NDC80 28 76 55 1,233 0.43 3.6 
Scenarios labelled with “vreH” include the total energy potential of “low quality” solar PV, 
and of offshore wind based on national assessments by the Ministry of Environment of Japan 
(Ministry of Environment of Japan, 2013, 2017). Low quality solar PV corresponds to the 
energy potential with lowest capacity factors (thus lowest unit electricity supply cost), which 
includes vertical surfaces (walls, facades) and surfaces with low exposure times to direct 
sunlight.  Offshore wind energy potential was corrected by density of wind turbines to 5 
MW/km2 Silva Herran, et al. (2016) (instead of 10 MW/km2 assumed in Ministry of 
Environment of Japan (2013)).   
 
 
   
Figure captions 
 
Figure 1  Outcomes for energy supply in the Reference scenario: a) primary energy supply by 
sources, b) electricity supply by technologies, c) final energy supply by carriers.   
 
Figure 2  Outcomes for energy supply in 2050 in all scenarios: a) primary energy supply by 
sources, b) electricity supply by technologies, c) final energy supply by carriers.   
 
Figure 3  Share of electricity in final energy supply 
 
Figure 4  Mapping of scenarios with respect to the impact of climate mitigation on the 
macroeconomy (GDP loss relative to the Reference scenario) and on energy security (a) in terms 
of the dependency on imported fuels (trade dependency), and (b) in terms of the diversity of 
primary energy sources (Shannon-Wiener diversity index).  Values for 2030 and 2050 are 
highlighted in grey and black, respectively.  GDP loss only account for mitigation costs and 
exclude damages due to the impacts of climate change.  
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